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Science, policy and place in volcanic disasters:
Insights from Montserrat
Amy Donovan *, Clive Oppenheimer
University of Cambridge, Department of Geography, Downing Place, Cambridge CB2 3EN, United Kingdom
1. Introduction
During the past 40 years, scientists have been involved in
advising governments about volcanic eruptions around the
world, often at short notice and in very difficult circumstances
(e.g. Tazieff, 1977; Voight, 1990; Newhall and Punongbayan,
1996; Aspinall et al., 2002; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012).
The importance of volcano monitoring and volcano observa-
tories has also been increasingly recognised (e.g. Tilling, 2008).
Nevertheless, the recent court case in L’Aquila has demon-
strated the potential legal implications of providing advice
under circumstances where the science is highly uncertain: in
November 2012, six Italian scientists and a local official were
convicted of manslaughter by an Italian court. There were
accusations of complicity with political attempts to maintain
public calm by underplaying the risk, but there were also
questions about the limits of earthquake science and whether
or not a low probability of an event suggests that it will not occur
(e.g. Marzocchi, 2012). Critically, this incidence has highlighted
the issue of risk communication between scientists and
governments, as well as with the affected population. This is
a question that has also dominated many interdisciplinary
research agendas – although the focus has generally been on
communication with the public (e.g. Haynes et al., 2008; Bird
et al., 2009, 2010; Gaillard, 2008). There is a favoured separation
between risk assessment – conducted by scientists – and risk
management, which is the purview of governments (e.g.
Marzocchi et al., 2012). Fig. 1 presents a simplified conceptual
representation of this process, taking as its basis a typical
‘‘linear model’’ approach to science and policy (e.g. Beck, 2011).
There are a number of issues that complicate the schematic
in Fig. 1 – including the social context and ramifications of
scientific advice, and the potentially very high levels of scientific
uncertainty involved. In addition, the role of volcano observa-
tories and advisory groups in many governmental structures
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requires them to undertake outreach, write public reports and
participate in setting alert levels and hazard zonation. All of
these activities are critical in volcano observatories, yet all of
them involve an interaction of sorts with the public. Scientists
may not be anonymous in their community – and the high
stakes of evacuation politics render them vulnerable (e.g.
Aspinall and Sparks, 2004; Donovan et al., 2012a). Indeed, risk
communication studies have shown very convincingly that
scientists are often well trusted and are the preferred source for
public education about active volcanoes (Haynes et al., 2008;
Bird et al., 2010). There is a moral imperative, then, even where
legal ones are not in place, for scientists to get involved in risk
communication with the public – and it may very well be part of
their job to do so. The cost of this may be that when false alarms
occur, or a situation akin to L’Aquila develops, scientists are put
in difficult, potentially unjust and very stressful positions. It is
critical, therefore, that lessons are learned from past crises, so
that the risk communication as well as the act of risk
assessment itself are undertaken with security and a full
awareness of the political, legal and public contexts.
The weaknesses of the linear model have been described by
a number of authors (e.g. Fischer, 2000; Pielke, 2004),
particularly in relation to the politicisation of science by
scientists and the technical-rational view of scientific knowl-
edge. The latter is significantly undermined by uncertainty
and also by the complexities of interaction between knowl-
edge and power (Rayner, 2003; Owens, 2005; Beck, 2011). There
are uncomfortable challenges when the linear model is
applied in democratic contexts, where participatory and
deliberative methods may be needed (e.g. Eden, 1998; Fischer,
2000, 2010; Brown, 2009; Jasanoff, 2005; Hajer and Kesselring,
1999; Owens, 2000; Gaillard and Mercer, 2013). In spite of this
criticism, the linear model as an ideal does persist (Owens,
2005; Marzocchi et al., 2012). In analysing the science–policy
interface in a volcanic disaster, however, we suggest that not
only is the linear model inaccurate in the ways suggested by
other authors, it is also not consistent with the experiences of
scientists and cultures under scientific and social uncertainty.
Indeed, volcanic crises involve the combination, over time, of:
shifting political and cultural landscapes as institutions and
populations are restructured, moved around and re-identify
themselves in the context of the eruptions (Skelton, 2000);
developing scientific knowledge (and non-knowledge due to
uncertainty) as scientists gather information and data about
the volcano; and high stakes. This creates a complex
environment in which reflexivity and transparency are critical
in opening up the advisory and policy process (Stirling, 2008).
In this article, we explore these ideas in the context of the
eruptions on Montserrat, British West Indies.
The eruptions of the Soufriere Hills Volcano on Montserrat in
the British West Indies began in July 1995. Lava extrusion ceased
in March 1998, but recommenced in November 1999 and
continued episodically until February 2010 (see Supplementary
Table 1). There were no previous eruptions on record, and the
capital city, where many of the 13,000 people lived, was located
on the flanks of the volcano. During 1995–1998, two thirds of the
population left. This was a time of significant political, social
and economic upheaval during which there was heavy
dependence on scientific advice. We refer to this period as
the ‘‘acute phase’’ of the eruption. The period from 1998 to 2010
is referred to as the ‘‘chronic phase’’. During this period, the
exclusion zone (approximately two thirds of the island) became
well-established, but there were periodic evacuations of areas
on its margins. In 1995, the Montserrat Volcano Observatory
(MVO) was set up to monitor the volcano. From 1997, regular risk
assessments were carried out by a group of international
scientists, who were formalised into a Scientific Advisory
Committee (SAC) in 2003 (see Supplementary Fig. 1).
This paper will first describe the methods used in data
collection and analysis. It then analyses the dialogue between
science and policy through the eruption, broadly chronologi-
cally. Initially we discuss the acute phase, during which
knowledge relationships were built between scientists, offi-
cials and the public. We then discuss some of the longer-term
issues that arose over the acute and chronic phases. Finally,
we examine the implications of a chronic eruption for land-
use challenges and also a long-lasting dialogue between
science and policy. In each of these time periods, we discuss
the complexity introduced by particular social, cultural and
political challenges. A detailed timeline and information about
the eruptions and the political context are provided as
supplementary data to this paper (see also Clay et al., 1999;
Pattullo, 2000; Aspinall et al., 2002; Donovan et al., 2013). The
paper argues that while linear approaches to science and
Fig. 1 – Traditional linear approach to science and policy on volcanoes.
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policy are attractive, the complexity, uncertainty and social
challenges that characterise eruptions suggest that a more
reflexive, socially conscious, approach to scientific advice and
political decision-making is required.
2. Methods
This paper, which is based on a project investigating the
interface between volcanology and policy on Montserrat, uses
interviews and participant observation as its main research
methods. In total, 62 interviews were carried out with
scientists, local officials, church leaders, Montserratians and
expatriates during three field seasons from 2008 to 2010.
Interviews were semi-structured and ranged in duration from
30 min to 2 h. Participant observation was carried out at the
MVO for two ten-week periods (April to June 2008 and March to
May 2009), during which time the researcher worked for the
observatory as a volunteer. In addition, extensive archival
analysis was undertaken, focussing on scientific reports from
the period studied (1995–2009), but also involving analysis of
newspapers (The Montserrat Reporter and a range of UK
papers) and government reports from DfID and the UK Privy
Council Judicial Committee. The analysis that follows is based
on the combination of these methods. Interviews were
recorded and transcribed where possible (dependent on
permission), and detailed field notes were taken. Interviewees
were selected by their role or through contacts in local
institutions (businesses and churches) using a ‘‘snowball’’
method. This allowed for a range of interviewees who had
experience of eruption management and its societal impacts.
The data were analysed using a coding system, identifying
themes that emerged during the interviews and were of
interest to the project. These concerned the role of scientific
advice, the governmental response to the eruption (both UK
and local governments); the development challenges faced by
the island; the relationship between Montserrat and the UK
and the preparation of the island prior to the eruption. The
demographic of the interviewees was evenly distributed
between the genders, and the age range was 18–80.
3. Translating information in the acute phase
In this section, we discuss some perspectives on the
negotiation of volcanic risk assessment and management in
the early acute stage of the eruption (July 1995 to March 1998;
see Supplementary Table 1), and the longer-term implications
of this for scientists working on the island. In particular, we
focus on the early education of the population and govern-
ment, and the impact that the crisis had on scientists’
perception of their role in its social context. We then discuss
local reflections on the reasons for difficulties in the risk
communication process during the acute phase.
3.1. Building relationships between scientists and
populations
In the late 1980s, two scientists had produced a report
detailing four potential volcanic scenarios that might occur
were the Soufriere Hills Volcano on Montserrat to reactivate
(the findings were also reported in a scientific publication by
Wadge and Isaacs (1988)). It is popularly held that the report
was washed into the sea by Hurricane Hugo in 1989; in any
case it was largely ignored, given that infrastructure was
rebuilt and modernised following the hurricane precisely in
some of the zones identified in the report as most at risk from
a resumption of volcanic activity. This was the source of
extensive criticism after the event (Clay et al., 1999). Some
local officials hold a rather more sanguine opinion about the
disappearance of the report: ‘‘The bottom line is that the
inquiry would have harmed the real estate value of
Richmond. So everybody has suffered.’’ The development
of the island would have been slowed down if there had been
any need to move from Plymouth. Furthermore, there is
evidence that issues with communication may have been a
causal factor:
Geoff Wadge’s paper was a paper. . . and it was academic.
Previous generations of Caribbean politicians were not
academics – much more so today . . . so I can just imagine
the paper arriving on the desk of the Chief Minister . . . who
would look at it, say ‘‘I can’t understand that’’, and it would
be filed. In fact, when the eruption happened they couldn’t
find a copy of Geoff Wadge’s report on island. . . It would
have been more useful if it had stimulated discussions. . . So
I think that paper should have stimulated some curricu-
lum, at least into the Secondary School, and it didn’t.
Shortcoming of the government of the time, and the
academic nature of the paper. It wasn’t designed for that.
Local official
This hints at the much broader problem of the uptake of
scientific research where it is relevant for governments –
there was a ‘‘lack of channels’’ (Clay et al., 1999) for the
communication of emerging research to policymakers,
perhaps particularly in small disciplines that deal with
low-probability events. Apart from the Wadge Report, limited
monitoring data and some other specialist geological studies,
there was relatively little information available at the start of
the eruption concerning its likely progression and magnitude.
This meant that two types of knowledge acquisition were
concurrent: that of volcanologists seeking to understand the
geology, geochemistry and geophysics of the volcanic system,
and that of citizens who had to learn about hazards and risk. It
also meant that the selection and involvement of experts
early in the eruption was not clearly structured (Donovan
et al., 2013). New institutions had to be formed, both in
government and for scientific advice. This was complicated
by the pace of the eruptive crisis:
We’d listen to the scientific advice from the chief scientist,
and then . . . would have to decide how to respond to that
advice, sometimes in very very very fast time. Local official
Possekel (1999) and Clay et al. (1999) both identify complex-
ities in governmental structures as presenting major chal-
lenges for managing the eruption. It was a problem that also
had a significant impact on the scientists as they tried to
secure resources for the new MVO during the late 1990s, and
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was exacerbated by the ambiguities in Montserrat’s colonial
status and identity (Skelton, 2000; Skinner, 2004; Donovan
et al., 2013). During this time, too, the scientists had to work
hard in communicating the risk to the public. Reports from
April 1996 demonstrate their anxiety:
The scientists believe that this is an extremely serious
situation, and that there is a possibility of an explosive
eruption of the Soufriere Hills volcano during the next few
days. Such an eruption could potentially affect much of the
south of Montserrat, and scientists urge that the residents
of the evacuated zone move to the safe zone tonight
(Wednesday). The safe zone remains safe. (3rd April)
The scientists at the MVO remain gravely concerned about
the current level of activity. (7th April)
The scientists at the MVO remain gravely concerned about
the current level of activity at the Soufriere Hills volcano
and therefore urge people still living in the evacuated zone
to leave immediately. (12th, 13th, 14th)
Volcanologists were seeking to manage a highly uncertain
situation with an inexperienced public. An important achieve-
ment in the risk communication process on Montserrat,
documented by Haynes et al. (2007), was the acceptance of
volcanology as a ‘‘young’’ science.
They would like to know for sure, and they don’t under-
stand why, with all the monitoring and all the science that
we do, why we can’t get it more exact. Senior scientist
Many Montserratians interviewed referred to volcanology
as ‘‘uncertain’’ or ‘‘inexact’’: they were aware that the
science could not tell them everything that they wanted to
know. This was regarded as frustrating but not the fault of
the scientists.
A further issue that was identified was the translation of
scientific information into information that was useful to the
public:
We have to transmit that information – but we also have to
ourselves go through the necessary step to convert purely
scientific observational data into observational data that
has a direct bearing on society. Senior scientist
The translation process is complex, not only because of the
complexity of the observational data, but also because of the
societal context.
It’s quite easy to say we should evacuate everybody when
you don’t have to suffer the consequences of that, so when
you’re working in an observatory, you’re actually much
more conscious of the impact you’re gonna have in terms of
decision making than if you take the decision from
thousands of kilometres away. Senior scientist
The problem is scientific advice is always seen as being:
what’s the social implications of it? I don’t think we can get
away from that. If we just say we’re giving scientific advice
then someone else has to do that job, and they are just
responding to what the scientists say, so you always have
to work in that area, and always you have to make sure
you’re comfortable with what you do. Senior scientist
This can be tied into individual experiences and relation-
ships, and the consequences for social interaction, particu-
larly on a small island:
Then there’s also obviously . . . when everything goes right
and the volcano’s not exploding too much and you don’t
actually have to evacuate people, people will kind of like
you. Senior scientist
Scientists thus have a liminal role: they relay information
about the volcano-as-object to the population, but also take in
information about the population. The following quotation is
from a report in 2007, and demonstrates the long-term
perspectives gained by the scientists:
Authorities need to consider the history of past responses
of the population to previous advice. . . For various reasons,
people in Montserrat, and elsewhere, often find it difficult
to envisage or accept the possibility of unusual or
exceptional volcanic hazards which, from their wider
experience, the scientists are aware could happen, and
many fail to respond to such precautionary warnings as
fully as is desirable. This information should feed back into
the decision-making process. . . Appendix 7, Scientific
Advisory Committee Report April 2007.
This act of translating the science not only for commu-
nication of the risk, but also for inclusion in a risk assessment
for the government resulted in the development of new
methods for risk assessment in volcanology (e.g. Aspinall,
1998). This quotation also demonstrates the reflexivity that is
involved in responding to different kinds of information
within the process of finalising advice.
The acute phase of the eruption was characterised by the
development of new institutional structures, legislation and
geographical identities, as the population were cast out of
Plymouth and forced to leave the island or live in the north
(Skelton, 2000; Pattullo, 2000). It also involved the growth of a
relationship between scientific communities and Montserra-
tian communities.
The good thing is that the scientists are always ready to
explain. . . they too, it was a learning experience for them
too, because they’ve never had to deal with people, per se –
they had only had to deal with the scientific aspect of it,
they’d never had to deal with actual people and the fact
that people, how people could be impacted by their
closeness to the volcano. . .as you know quite a number
of them have earned their PhDs as a result of the volcano,
and they are not the same people. Montserratian
The local knowledge of the scientists – not just in terms of
knowing the physical geography of the island, but also being
aware of more human impacts from the volcano – had an
impact on their experience. It also impacted the ways in which
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the population viewed them. This is a critical aspect of high-
stakes scientific advisory contexts: awareness of the extremity
of the shock and its impacts on a society is emotive. As local
people became ‘‘amateur volcanologists’’, scientists them-
selves became attached to the island. These complex inter-
actions are an important part of the dialogue between science
and society.
3.2. Cultural perspectives on risk perception
Interviewees reflected on their understanding of the pre-
eruption risk from the volcano:
Fourteen years ago, if anybody had told us it would be
better to build our homes over here in the north, rather
than in Plymouth, we’d have said, ‘You’ve got to be joking!’
Even when the Wadge report came out in 1986, even if each
of us individually, even if 12,000 had got a copy and had
read it. . .when I later build my house up there. . .even if they
say to you, well the volcano might erupt, I’d say, yeah it
might, but after I’m dead and gone! Montserratian
This is consistent with the findings of other studies, which
have shown that people struggle with conceptualising high
impact but low probability events – and that they will put daily
concerns about convenience and living costs ahead of such
considerations (e.g. Gaillard, 2008). The subsequent process of
corporate learning on Montserrat was also discussed by
interviewees:
Until 25 June, people never thought that villages could be
taken away, people could have died – mind you, scientists
were saying that. . . but because you just never had the
experience. . .but we learn – that is what life is all about, a
learning experience. Montserratian
The experience of a risky event has been shown to improve
risk perception for future events (the availability bias; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973), so the lack of precedent on Montserrat
made future eruptions difficult to visualise. The events of
‘‘Twenty-five’’ (25 June 1997, when 19 people were killed in the
exclusion zone) shocked the population and brought them
together to grieve (Donovan et al., 2011). One local official on
Montserrat commented, when asked what might have been
done pre-eruption to prepare Montserrat for the potential
eruption, that:
I’ve walked across the volcanic crater where the dome now
sits. . .and it was a beautiful valley. I didn’t realise it was a
volcanic crater. I would guess that 99% of the people in
Montserrat didn’t know. . .. We should have known, so I
think that there should have been more work done over the
years and maybe the scientists who came on and off over
the years were guilty of that – that they didn’t insist on we’d
got to understand the volcanics. . ..
At the same time, he continued:
It’s never erupted in recorded history, . . . so there’s no
culture of remembrance, there’s no stories, no songs and
no music about the volcano to give people that long-term
message. . . and if you look now at the cultural awakening of
Montserrat because of the volcano – now let’s hope that
that output that that cultural awakening has produced
stays with us, goes into folklore. . . I think that’s what was
lacking before. Yes, we knew that people remember the
earthquakes. . .but nobody realised they were earthquakes
of magma trying to reach the surface – they thought it was
in the big fault-line.
This quotation again demonstrates the importance of local
knowledge, as enshrined in folklore and memory (e.g. Wisner
et al., 2004; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Paton et al., 2010), in
building pre-disaster community resilience. It also demon-
strates, importantly, movement in the opposite direction: a
lack of initial awareness of the volcano has had impacts on
subsequent cultural development.
4. Multilayered cultures of risk during the
acute and chronic phases
In this section, we discuss some of the geographical factors
that affected the dialogue between science and policy
throughout the eruption, focussing particularly on Montser-
rat’s status as a UK Overseas Territory, and the consequences
of the eruption for emigration and immigration. Both of these
areas had significant impacts on the risk communication
process, further demonstrating that the linear model is
oversimplified: complex political and geographical structures
affect the reception of scientific advice.
4.1. Colonial complexity and migration
Scientific advice is also affected by its cultural and political
context, both in terms of its institutional framing and its
reception by the public. The challenges of appreciating the
potential hazards (which requires education from scientists)
and accepting the possibility of whole-scale social change
(chiefly loss of property, but also possible loss of life),
particularly given a lack of preparedness and consequent
(unconscious) complacency, engender a very steep learning
curve. Unlike hurricanes, which occur relatively frequently in
the Caribbean but are over quickly, volcanic eruptions can last
years, and like all natural disasters they pose particular
problems for small islands (Pelling and Uitto, 2001; Tompkins,
2005). In the case of Montserrat, this was exacerbated by the
complexity of the relationship between the UK and the island,
which blurred local and colonial geographies of science and
governance (Clay et al., 1999; Donovan et al., 2013). The
political geography is layered, resulting in a complex geo-
graphy of risks and risk perceptions between London and
Montserrat. In turn, this had a significant impact on the
vulnerability and capacity of the islanders, and the science–
policy interface, as resources, institutions and laws were
managed between nations.
Different cultures respond to risk in different ways
(Kahan et al., 2009; Paton et al., 2010). These are most
starkly apparent at the occurrence of a sudden shock: the
point at which a background risk is realised. The self-styled
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knowledge-identities of the population(s) may be comple-
tely re-shaped by the event – in Montserrat, this was the
case particularly in relation to place names, spaces of social
interaction and personal risk priorities. The culturally rich
south was destroyed, and houses had to be rebuilt in the
undeveloped north. The uncertainty concerning the dura-
tion of the eruption was critical in this: once the longevity of
the eruption became apparent after 1999, political and
institutional changes took on a more permanent form. For
example, a seven-constituency system was replaced with a
single constituency in April 2001 (prior to that, elections for
each evacuated constituency were held in the safe zone).
Geographical identities were exchanged – initially through
the pairing of towns, but later through purely social
networks, such as churches and friendships and through
different needs (such as the need to educate children off-
island). These motions shaped the ways in which new
knowledge was made and replaced the old.
Scientists with a long-term involvement on Montserrat
identified the colonial discourses as a major influence on risk
communication and the application of science-based policy
early in the eruption:
I think a lot of it has to do with the relationship of
Montserrat with the UK government. . .. I think some people
felt that the UK government had a hidden agenda. . . that
there was always some other agenda. . . that was driving
what the scientists were saying, and what certain scientists
were saying. Senior scientist
A further issue is considerable lateral variation in personal
and societal risk thresholds. These may vary individually, on
cultural or historical grounds, for example (Slovic, 2000;
Sjoberg, 2000): ‘‘In those territories, economic development
can never take off, because every fifty years, on average, each
island gets zapped completely [by hurricanes]’’ (senior
scientist).
Demographic changes also had a significant impact on the
risk communication process. The exodus produced by the
eruption had created a labour vacuum from the late 1990s:
We had in government a great challenge because we’d lost
many of our senior civil servants – people with a passionate
interest in their children’s education, who tended to be the
better educated people, took them off-island and left their
jobs. Local official
This led to an influx of people from other islands into these
jobs and to the construction sector – where jobs had been
created by the need for housing in the north. There are a thus
variety of publics involved in Montserrat’s human geography
of risk, including a growing number of immigrants from
Guyana, Dominica, Jamaica and Trinidad, whose familiarity
with the geography of the island is fundamentally different
from that of islanders:
When they say, ‘‘oh it’s coming down Gages Wall’’, I have
no idea where Gages is . . . point out to them where Gages is,
because people like us who only come to Belham and take a
peek over have probably not been to Cork Hill or those areas
– don’t tell us ‘‘Tar River’’ – means nothing to us. Tell us
‘‘Tar River is over to Antigua’’. . . Trinidadian resident of
Montserrat
In spite of the population boost, however, there was
ambivalence in government, and this led to some political
disputes between London and Montserrat.
The government of Montserrat want to bring back
Montserratians. That is not cost effective. . .we have over
2000 non-Montserratians living on the island, who send
95% of their salaries overseas. . . but. . .at the same time as
they want to increase the population, the government of
Montserrat has just announced more stringent rules for
getting your citizenship, which Britain has told them
they’ve got to rescind. Local official
The reluctance of the Montserratian government to
embrace newcomers was perhaps part of Montserrat’s
grieving process: the diaspora left gaping holes in society. It
also demonstrates a growing sense of shared identity through
the experience of the crisis. There was also a perception that
immigration may be used as a means to obtain a UK passport
(after seven years), and therefore that the intent of immigrants
is not ultimately to help Montserrat – and supporting such
immigrants may be challenging in any case.
They keep saying, ‘‘Oh we need to bring the Montserratians
back.’’ Where are they going to live? If you can’t house the
people that are on island – we’ve still got shelters. The man
who was living under a boat I found out about last week, I’m
moving into a shelter this week. Local official
This has been complicated by the colonial context (all
Overseas Territory citizens became British citizens in May
2002):
Now, to make it worse, everybody is British, so they should
be on par with the British citizen in Britain – and let them –
if the Isle of Anglesey had this natural disaster like
Montserrat had, let me see them go through the same
things that Montserrat went through, because there would
be riots in the streets and there would be the press up in
arms . . .you can’t have a second tier of British citizens. . .
Local official
Montserrat’s geographical location was clearly identified as
a factor in the management of the volcanic risk: out of sight,
out of mind. The same local official noted, ‘‘the very fact that
we still have shelter spaces is a total, abject, utter disgrace, and
a slur on the British government’’. Yet, ‘‘we would not have got
through the crisis’’ without UK aid: Montserrat had little
diplomatic prowess early in the eruption, according to a senior
local official present prior to the eruption, and that would have
made it more difficult to get aid. Scientific institutions
providing advice on Montserrat had to negotiate complex
colonial political structures as well as communicating with the
evolving demographic on the island.
The fact that many scientists involved in advisory
processes were British added a further layer of complexity
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to the identification and re-identification of the island. The
negotiation of the risk that was faced by Montserratians
since 1995 has been characterised by the complex inter-
twining of UK, Montserratian and scientific realisations.
Social theories of risk and of science can provide important
insights into the complexities of local risk realisations,
which should feed into disaster management. Different
perceptions of risk can also be read into a society – as UK
measures of risk such as the Chief Medical Officer’s scale,
used in SAC reports, were read into a community with
entirely different risk experiences.
5. Risk governance and responsibility in the
chronic phase
In the years following the resumption of volcanic activity in
November 1999 (see Supplementary Table 1), the need to view
the eruption as chronic rather than a crisis eventually became
clear. However, the episodic nature of the eruptions, the
uncertainty surrounding the volcanic activity and the limited
land area continued to require reflexive risk management.
This section discusses perspectives on the chronic phase and
its management. It also notes the prevalent view in the
interviews that scientific advice, as the primary basis for
decisions, may not be clearly separated from those decisions
in practice: populations may view the two as inextricably
linked.
Montserrat’s colonial status renders it a special case
politically: the Governor has ultimate responsibility for
internal security. However, he includes the democratically
elected politicians, local officials and religious leaders in the
discussions, before making a decision to evacuate part of the
island. The MVO is expected to advise the National Disaster
Preparedness and Response Advisory Committee (NDPRAC),
chaired by the Governor, about the volcanic activity, and this
leads directly to policy decisions which may have very
damaging political implications. One previous governor
commented,
I wanted to act on the side of caution, and to err, if possible,
on the side of caution in asking people to move – one
responded to the advice, to the report of the scientists, and
that was the basis, largely, for our decisions. Clearly the
scientists gave advice, but they can’t make the decisions –
ultimately it’s for the civil authorities to make the
decisions.
Precaution in volcanic risk management is therefore two-
sided: it applies both to protecting safety, and preventing the
economic loss of an unnecessary evacuation – a ‘‘lives versus
livelihoods’’ choice (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Wisner
et al., 2004). In this case, erring on the side of caution was
considered preferable because of the perceived lack of
scientific knowledge about the volcano: a mutation of the
precautionary principle applied not to the as-yet-unknown
consequences of modernisation, but to governance in a
society threatened by scientific uncertainty. It was also a
consequence of experience on Montserrat – the nineteen
deaths on 25th June 1997, of people who had refused to leave
their homes and farms (their livelihood), had a considerable
impact on scientists and policymakers.
The scientists will give the best advice possible, and they
will say ‘‘Listen, we are not comfortable with certain things
and we don’t know what’s likely to happen’’ . . . then the
authorities will make a decision based on a precautionary
measure . . . so that the scientists could monitor a little
more, and then if they are satisfied they will move the
people back. Local official
In the case of volcanic risk governance on Montserrat,
taking high levels of uncertainty and translating it to policy
has been a collaborative process between scientists and
political officials. Scientists interviewed were aware of this.
This model of the scientists in one camp, the decision-
makers in another, scientists communicate to the decision-
makers, who say thank you very much, we’ll make a
decision – it doesn’t happen on Montserrat, and I’m not
sure it happens necessarily all that well in a lot of
situations. Senior scientist
This sentiment was noted by several interviewees: the
boundaries between providing advice and being involved in
decision-making were murky because of the high dependence
on scientific advice. A further complication is introduced by
the colonial context:
London will inevitably be much more cautious because
London’s standards of risk management tend to get
applied, and the general level of risk that’s acceptable to
people living in the Caribbean is higher than the general
level of risk accepted by people who walk around London,
so that you’ve got different societal understandings of risk,
and anyone who wants to develop Montserrat, a stable
Montserrat, who comes to Montserrat, is accepting a higher
background level of risk anyway as a result of volcanic
activity. Local official
This is important because it suggests that there are
differences between Montserrat’s risk culture and that of
London. Officials from London in the early part of the crisis
were concerned that the island should be shut down
because of the activity. During the chronic phase, however,
efforts were made to distinguish between what was
appropriate for Montserrat and the temptation to read into
Montserrat a risk culture that was London-derived. How-
ever, this also raises the important issue of risk tolerance –
one that was resisted by some interviewees, who felt it was
completely unhelpful.
I think that the ones that are the most antagonistic feel that
the scientists are just guessing. I think that’s one end of the
spectrum. And then I think that the middle of the road
people, like myself, appreciate what they’re saying, know
that . . . it can change because so does the mountain, and
therefore we can kind of sympathise with both the
government or the Governor and the scientists, because
they’re kind of caught. And then there’s the other end of the
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spectrum – people that are petrified of the volcano.
Montserratian
This quotation demonstrates the complexity of the
knowledge-testing process: it is highly subjective. It also
creates anxiety: the anxiety of scientists concerning
their liability is clear from reports, particularly from 2002
onwards (when there were several court cases about
evacuations). The formalisation of advice into the SAC was
largely to gain greater protection, and SAC reports contain a
disclaimer, pointing to the government’s responsibility for
its decisions.
You start thinking, what is the responsibility of the
politicians? And their responsibility, at least to my mind,
is . . . there are real risks, so if the volcano is acting up and
half the people in the Belham Valley don’t think it is
because they’re in denial or their risk perception either is
that the scientists are talking nonsense or that they don’t
feel there’s a risk, but the objective best evidence-based
assessment is that there is a high risk, then the govern-
ment’s got the responsibility of protecting those people, so
they can’t let the risk perception of the people change the
decision. . . they might want to factor it in, but they might
factor it in in a way that’s not necessarily scientifically
based. Senior scientist
The technical-rational invocation of evidence-basing sits
uneasily with the different kinds of knowledge that are used in
the policy process. There is a non-linear relationship involved
in weighing often-uncertain scientific evidence with public
concerns and political costs. While this is viewed as the
purview of governments, scientists were aware of ambiguities
and expressed strong views about objectivity in the context of
social demands. Others mentioned a different kind of
responsibility:
And the volcano over the years has become a very good
excuse – if things don’t go right it must be because of the
volcano, and at the end of the day it comes down to this:
you blame the MVO, you blame the volcano because of the
economic situation and so on. Well, if you live on the
boundary of the exclusion zone lower down, so that you’ll
be evacuated if the volcanic activity increases, I’m sorry
you have to take responsibility for that. If you don’t want to
actually handle the possibility of being evacuated again,
you have to move to another area. Senior scientist
This demonstrates that even after 15 years of eruptions,
there was occasional anxiety between scientists and decision-
makers and the public. The frustration inherent in this
quotation was expressed by multiple interviewees: managing
the responsibility for the volcano and the responsibility for
inconveniencing people was challenging. However, in 1995,
few people knew that the volcano was active. In 2010, building
a house near the exclusion zone boundary might be
considered irresponsible. This issue is complicated by the
continued immigration of expatriates, since arrival during a
volcanic ‘‘pause’’ may mislead people. The increased immi-
gration of the 2000s has required reflexive governance.
6. Conclusions: science, governance and
decision-making on Montserrat
This paper has demonstrated that the eruptions on Montserrat
raised a number of key issues regarding eruption management
and scientific advice more generally. Many volcanoes have
exhibited an ability to erupt over decadal scales, and this
presents significant challenges for land use, particularly on
smaller territories. It also requires a clear definition of the
science–policy interface in the context of volcanic risk. The
narratives that emerge from our analysis demonstrate that
Fig. 2 – Completed schematic for science and policy in volcanic context.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 5 0 – 1 6 1 157
there was sometimes a lack of clarity in the public perception
of governance – particularly as a result of the colonial context,
but also because of the influx of residents from other islands.
They also show that colonial governance of Montserrat caused
significant complications in the way that volcanic risk was
managed and led to some challenges for scientists both in
their reporting structures and in handling the public response
to their advice. The very high stakes involved, particularly
early in the eruption when the uncertainty was high and many
more people lived close to the volcano, demonstrate the
importance of establishing advisory pathways in government
that can be adapted to low-probability events (Sparks, 2007).
The eruptions on Montserrat between 1995 and 2010
involved an intense process of negotiation between scientists,
policymakers and the public. This negotiation concerned lives,
livelihoods, political motivations, colonial tensions, scientific
interpretations, institutional differences and local culture.
Many of these issues would have been easier to manage had
Table 1 – Summary of issues raised in the paper. White denotes scientific issues; light grey, science–policy issues and
dark grey refers to issues that are scientific, political and societal.
Inference Evidence Implication
 There are geographical variations in the
resources and expectations of
volcanologists
Interviews; Haynes (2005); Aspinall et al.
(2002)
Sensitivity and respect between scientists,
even where they disagree, is critical in a
crisis
 Volcanologists vary in their identification
with local political and economic
challenges, and their emotional responses
Interviews; Haynes (2005); Pattullo (2000) Volcanologists and social scientists have to
be aware of this possibility in themselves
and others
 Different disciplines may have conflicting
interpretations of the evidence.
Consensus may be difficult to achieve
Interviews; field notes; Aspinall et al. (2002) Methods such as expert elicitation and
structured discussions are important in risk
management where there is no consensus
 Contractual operation of a volcano
observatory can produce challenges for
existing institutional structures
Interviews; Aspinall et al. (2002) There is a need for flexible institutional
structures to manage long-term volcanic
eruptions
 Decisions in volcanic eruptions are very
heavily dependent on science, meaning
that scientists may be blamed for poor
decisions even when they did not
explicitly take them
Interviews; survey data Donovan and
Oppenheimer (2012); Haynes (2005)
Roles should be clearly delineated, but
where there is overlap or conflict, the
uncertainty inherent in scientific advice has
to be communicated
 Complex political systems can create
significant challenges, such as knowing
who to report to first and who is
responsible for which aspects of risk
management
Interviews; Haynes (2005); Donovan and
Oppenheimer (2012)
Scientists with monitoring responsibilities
should ensure that they are familiar with
the details of government structures at all
times. External scientists need to be aware
of this issue when entering a new situation
 There are cultural differences between
groups of scientists from different regions
and between scientists and populations
Interviews; field notes. Careful communication and awareness of
potential culture clashes might aid
communication within and beyond the
scientific community
 Advisory groups may have a role in
persistent eruptions. The SAC provide a
level of continuity and a different
perspective that is valuable to the public
and local officials
Interviews; documentary evidence The involvement of several groups of
scientists may be helpful, if everyone
involved is aware of their particular role
and remit
 Politicians and local officials frequently
perceive priorities, the important factors
and potential consequences differently
from scientists
Interviews, field notes Interdisciplinary work involving social and
political scientists should be an integral part
of crisis management
 Channels for scientific advice are most
effective when they are built on personal
trust rather than a report
Interviews Advisory mechanisms should be in place
even when the volcano is quiet, and risk
assessments should be communicated to
governments both on paper and in person
where possible
 Risk communication is a dialogue: people
respond more positively if they feel that
they can relate to those giving the
warnings
Interviews; documentary evidence;
field notes
Perceived empathy and listening to
residents’ concerns may aid the risk
communication process
 Risk communication directly between
scientists and the public was very much
appreciated on Montserrat
Haynes (2005); interviews Scientists are highly trusted in many places
and may be the best source of information
 Trust is dependent on transparency Interviews; Haynes (2005) Intelligent publics appreciate being trusted
by their advisors
 Local sensitivities and geographical
factors including migration may
introduce complexity
Interviews Modes of communication should be
reviewed regularly in the context of social
changes
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an observatory been in place prior to the eruption, with
scientists who were known to the local officials. Nevertheless,
it is likely that a small island observatory would have required
assistance in a crisis, and different groups of scientists would be
involved. Disciplinary and cultural differences play a key role in
the negotiation of dialogue during crisis advice, even where
methods are deployed to harmonise the scientific opinion
(Aspinall et al., 2002). Scientists have emotional and personal
responses to disasters and to the pressure of the public and
political demand for knowledge that does not exist. This context
can present challenges in communication, especially where a
third party is mediating information (as occurred early in the
eruptions). Newhall et al. (1999) developed some guidelines for
crisis management, and this study affirms those suggestions. It
would add to them the need for scientists to reflect regularly on
their activities and context, and to ensure that they are familiar
with local government structures and cultural sensitivities prior
to arrival at a crisis, as suggested in Fig. 2. Social scientific input
would aid this. Local institutional structures, cultural aware-
ness and other place-based knowledges may be critical in the
rapid development of effective advisory practices. The linear
model thus significantly oversimplifies the process of risk
management. The broader results we have described are
summarised in Table 1 and Figs. 2 and 3.
We suggest, based on the experience of Montserrat, that
instead of fighting for a top-down process in which scientists
have knowledge and people must respond unquestioningly, or
focussing too closely on a bottom-up approach that denies the
importance of scientific input, that greater transparency and
reflexivity might aid the process of risk assessment and
management. Transparency does not only involve reports of
activity and monitoring data, but also personal interaction
with the public and respect of the public. In particular, the
limitations of the science must be clear – this was noted early
in the eruption on Montserrat and appreciated greatly by
interviewees (see also Haynes et al., 2008). It is important to
put numbers on risk, and acknowledge the uncertainties on
the numbers – but it is also important to discuss different types
of uncertainty. Frequently, the uncertainties on scientific risk
assessments are so high that people do not take them
seriously (if they look at them!), and this can discourage
scientists from such reports. However, the critical component
here is social uncertainty – a form of indeterminacy (Wynne,
1992; Hinchliffe, 2001; Donovan et al., 2012b): the safety of the
population is no longer certain, potential impacts are not well
understood, the consequences of not evacuating may be high
and the behaviour of the population cannot be predicted
easily. In addition, scientists and decision-makers themselves
may be uncertain and concerned about how a population will
react to a ‘‘false alarm’’, fearing recriminations and refusal to
cooperate with future warnings that may be necessary. The
impact of social context and expectations on scientists may
produce anxiety, but can also be mobilised – if managed
reflexively and transparently.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.envsci.2013.08.009.
Fig. 3 – ‘‘Nested caldera’’ conceptual model for the role of scientists in disasters.
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